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Abstract
This work replicates a similar study performed by de Silva et al. (2001). Our study
was performed on the South African market. de Silva et al. (2001) studied the effect
of cross-sectional volatility (CSV) on fund managerial skill measurement. This lead
to the conjecture that increased fund performance dispersion was primarily due to
higher CSV, and not changes in informational efficiency or ranges in managerial
talent.
In this dissertation we firstly critique the CSV-adjusted alpha as a measure of
fund performance and show that it can only be used as a means of normalising
fund performance, yet reveals very little with regard to managerial talent. Since
fund performance is intrinsically linked to CSV, we find it difficult to disentangle
the effects of CSV and managerial talent dispersion. Adjusting for CSV therefore
also implies adjustment for managerial talent, and we conclude with ideas for how
a CSV-adjusted alpha may be used to assess manager talent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the United States, research on cross-sectional volatility (CSV) by de Silva et al.
(2001) has found that fund return dispersion can be attributed to wider dispersion
amongst the available stock choices in the market and therefore, by implication
has little to do with the range of managerial skill. Researchers had to reconsider
how fund performance was calculated as a result of the return dispersion increases.
Instead of just considering performance measurement as a function of benchmark
exceedances, researchers incorporated return dispersion information as well. They
concluded their work by adjusting alpha estimates for the variance across the range
of constituent securities using two distinct measures of security return dispersion:
periodic and asset class. To compute alpha estimates researchers used ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) given as
(rP,t − rF,t) = αP + βP (rM,t − rF,t) + εP,t, (1.1)
where rP,t, rM,t and rF,t are time series returns for the active portfolio, market and
risk free asset respectively.
Remark 1.1 (Market Model Estimates). For a more intuitive understanding of
Equation (1.1), the market model, we can interpret αP , βP and P as follows
(αP ) Portfolio Alpha Often referred to as abnormal return in the literature
(see Strong (1992)), alpha is the intercept term of the market model. Alpha
is a measure of risk compensation and can, when scaled appropriately,
be used as a measure for fund performance comparisons. It is possible
for alpha to take on any value along the real line however values larger
(smaller) than 3% (-3%) are far less likely to occur in practice.
(βP ) Portfolio Beta The beta of a portfolio is a measure of the portfolio’s
return sensitivity to movements in the benchmark’s return to which it is
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being compared. In practice, betas greater than one represent securities
which are more sensitive to benchmark movements, betas between zero and
one are less sensitive to benchmark movements and finally, securities with
zero betas bear no benchmark sensitivity. Investors with higher risk aver-
sions are attracted to betas less than one, and risk lovers, to betas greater
than one. To understand why this is true, consider Equation (1.2), the
variance of the portfolio:
σ2rp,t = β
2
Pσ
2
rM,t
+ σ2εP,t . (1.2)
We define σ2rp,t, β
2
Pσ
2
rM,t
and σ2εP,t as the variance of the portfolio return,
systematic risk and portfolio specific risk respectively. Note that as the beta
increases ceteris paribus the variance of the portfolio also increases. Thus
betas larger than one are associated with lower risk aversions. We extract
portfolio betas from the market model, where beta is the slope of this model.
(εP,t) Portfolio Epsilon The error, commonly referred to in the literature as
idiosyncratic risk has negligible correlation with market risk and is often
diversified away by constructing funds which contain more than one asset.
In the market model we assume epsilon is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2εP,t.
Ankrim and Ding (2002) provide an insightful mathematical definition of CSV
which we utilise in the next Section of this Chapter. The primary focus of their re-
search was the relationship of active manager dispersion (95th versus 5th percentile)
to CSV. They asked and answered three questions:
1. Question: Is the increasing CSV associated solely with U.S. large-caps?
Answer: After investigating market wide CSV and equity markets outside of
the U.S. they concluded that the association is not limited to U.S. large-caps.
2. Question: Has it happened before?
Answer: Considering 20 years of historical CSV data from Japans equity mar-
ket they found that this was not the first time markets experienced increasing
CSV.
3. Question: Is it a result of the technology boom (bust)?
Answer: By comparing CSV data computed inside the “technology boom”
period (1999 to 2001) with data outside of the boom period they found no
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statistically significant difference, concluding that the increasing CSV was not
a result of the technology boom (bust).
Ankrim and Ding (2002) were unable to determine the cause of the increasing CSV
observed from 1996 to 2001.
Raubenheimer (2012) posed the question: “How can fund sponsors fairly and
accurately evaluate their managers performance in light of the changing CSV of
realised returns?” The author established that the existence of dispersion in fund
returns over time produced a heteroskedastic time series. Heteroskedasticity renders
regular parametric tests meaningless namely, OLS regression. The alpha from OLS
regression would normally be used to compare funds and establish which is superior.
Raubenheimer advocated Sharpe ratio calculations, weighting returns and weighted
least squares (WLS) regression as the appropiate adjustments in light of the hetero-
skedasticity evident in data. This approach mirrored de Silva et al. (2001).
This dissertation focuses on the concept of cross-sectional volatility (CSV), thus
an appropriate definition follows as a prelude to the research. Chapter 2 details a
simulation of a simplified market containing stocks, funds and a bond. In Chapter 3
we briefly discuss fund and CSV data observed from the South African market,
choosing appropriate time windows for analysis. Next, applying the relevant meth-
odologies defined in Chapter 4 we generate results found in Chapter 5. These meth-
odologies include least squares regression (the market model), weighted least squares
regression (CSV adjusted), and tests for heteroskedasticity. In Chapter 6 we con-
clude by answering the research question: “Does cross-sectional volatility effect per-
formance measurement in South Africa?”, summarising the relevant findings and
suggesting further research.
Important notice: All the institutional data was graciously provided by Al-
exander Forbes. The institutional data used in this dissertation is a manipulated
version of the Forbes data. Thus all alphas calculated and presented are not an exact
reflection of the Forbes data (see Section 4.4). We would like to thank Alexander
Forbes for providing this invaluable data for the purpose of this research.
1.1 What is Cross-sectional Volatility?
Cross-sectional volatility (CSV) is formally defined as a metric which measures the
dispersion of a set of asset returns at a particular point in time. Note, that this is
different from asset return volatility (also known as longitudinal volatility) which
measures the return dispersion for a single asset over a time period. We have illus-
trated the difference between CSV and longitudinal volatility in Figure 1.1.
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Fig. 1.1: Visual comparison of cross-sectional and longitudinal volatility.
Each column in Figure 1.1 represents an asset (security) and each grey block
represents a return at a particular date. Longitudinal volatility is calculated by
square-rooting the average of squared differences of the columns, whereas CSV is
calculated by square-rooting the average of the squared differences of the rows.
As per Ankrim and Ding (2002), let cross-sectional variance be denoted as X2t
for a time period t. Note that we would have to square-root X2t to attain CSV.
Then for a market containing Nt assets, cross-sectional variance is defined by
X2t =
Nt∑
i=1
wit(rit − rmt)2, (1.3)
where wit is the market portfolio weight of stock i at the beginning of time period t,
rit is the return of stock i over the time period associated with t, rmt =
∑Nt
i=1witrit is
the weighted market return over time period t and Nt is the number of stocks in the
market at the beginning of time period t. Substituting 1Nt for wit in Equation (1.3)
enforces equal weights for all stocks and calculates uniform CSV while the expression
as given is used for market capitalisation-weighted CSV calculations.
Chapter 2
Simulating the Effect of
Cross-sectional Volatility
In this chapter we study the effects of cross-sectional volatility (CSV) on fund per-
formance in a controlled simulated market. We start off by making several assump-
tions and then close off with result interpretation.
2.1 Simulation Assumptions and Methodology
Firstly we list several assumptions about the market and the models’ for stocks and
funds:
1. Assume there exists a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with a filtration Ft. All
assets in the market are adapted to Ft.
2. A constant risk free rate of interest exists (r) and we define Bt, a bond price
process with the dynamics
dBt = rBtdt.
3. The stock price S
(i)
t obeys the dynamics of a geometric Brownian motion.
dS
(i)
t = µiS
(i)
t dt+ σiS
(i)
t dX
(i)
t ,
where X
(i)
t is a correlated P-Brownian motion and dX
(i)
t dX
(j)
t = ρijdt, S
(i)
t the
price of stock i at time t and µi and σi are the drift and volatility parameters
of stock i respectively.
4. No stock pays dividends.
5. It is possible to borrow and lend any amount of cash at the risk free rate.
6. It is possible to go long any amount of stock (i.e. It is not possible to go short).
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7. The market is frictionless, i.e. there are no costs associated with any of the
above transactions.
8. If there are NS unique stocks in the market, a manager can only have half that
number of stocks in their fund.
9. Fund managers re-balance at every time point.
10. Funds are constructed at random, i.e. Managers choose stocks at random and
assign random weights to each stock.
11. Funds contain a maximum of 30% cash and 70% equity. It not possible for
either of these to have zero weight.
12. CSV used in this model is uniformly weighed and computed using stock re-
turns.
We made several further assumptions about the initial conditions of the market:
Tab. 2.1: Table of model parameters and their descriptions
Parameter Description
Number of Stocks A constant, NS = 50
Number of Funds A constant, NF = 10
Path length A constant, n = 250
Initial Stock Price A constant, S
(i)
0 = 100
Initial Bond Price A constant, B
(i)
0 = S
(i)
0
Drift µi = aµ + bµu
Volatility σi = aσ + bσu
In Table 2.1, aµ, aσ and bµ, bσ are shifting and scaling parameters respectively
and u is a pseudo-random uniform number between zero and one.
Combining all the aforementioned assumptions we constructed a market by gen-
erating stock price paths and one bond price path (The market only contains two
types of assets). We then computed returns, Return = Assett+1Assett − 1, for each asset.
Next, using a notional index value of 100 in conjunction with the growth of S
(i)
t we
generated a price path for each S
(i)
t , i = 1, . . . , NS . Averaging over all these price
paths we computed the index (Also referred to as the benchmark in this simulation)
price path1, which was then used to compute the index return, Ir. Another set
1 We have thus created a uniformly weighted index.
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of data points we needed were fund returns, the following algorithm was used to
construct the fund returns:
1. Generate NF uniform pseudo-random integers kj between two and NS/2. kj
is the number of stocks fund j will pick.
2. Sample kj uniform pseudo-random integers between one and NS without re-
placement and store them in a vector qj . For example, let k1 = 3 and NS = 10
then we choose 3 numbers at random between one and ten without replace-
ment, qj = {5, 2, 9}. Note that qj will never have repeated elements i.e.
qs 6= qt,∀s 6= t. The elements of qj represent the stocks picked by fund j.
3. Generate wj , j = 1, . . . , NF where wj is a uniform pseudo-random vector of
integers. The first kj elements of wj are chosen between one and 70 (allocation
to stock i) and the last element is chosen between ten and 30 (allocation to
cash) therefore wj has x = kj + 1 elements. Now calculate w
N
j =
wj∑
x wx
for
every vector wj , the normalisation of wj .
4. Multiply the first kj weights in wj by the (kj)th stock returns selected, at the
same time multiply the (kj + 1)th weight by the bond return. Now sum all
these products together to produce the fund return time series for fund j.
5. Repeat steps one to four for all j = 1, . . . , NF funds.
The above algorithm generates NF funds each with a random holding in equity and
a smaller random holding in bonds. The last time series we needed was the CSV of
the stocks which we calculated using the formula:
Xt =
√√√√NS∑
i=1
1
NS
(
rit − 1
NS
NS∑
i=1
rit
)2
(2.1)
where rit is the return of stock i for the time period associated with t, NS is the
number of stocks in the market. Xt is uniformly weighted CSV. We then computed
normalised inverse CSV defined as follows
X⊥t =
1
Xt∑
t
1
Xt
.
Remark 2.1 (Least Squares Regressions). This remark details the first principle
mathematics of OLS and WLS regressions.
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Linear least squares For this model we assume that the equation which ties
the explanatory variable (x) to the response (y) is linear. We thus have
an equation
y = c1 + c2x+ ,  ∼ N(0, σ2) (2.2)
where c1 and c2 are coefficients and  is residual error. We wish to solve for
c1 and c2 thus we can set up an equation S, a system of n simulataneous
linear equations of two unknowns. Note that the system is overdetermined
if n is greater than the number of unknowns. We write
S =
n∑
i=1
(yi − (c1 + c2xi))2 (2.3)
The least squares fitting process minimises the summed square of the re-
siduals. The coefficients are determined by differentiating S with respect
to each parameter, and setting the result equal to zero. Mathematically,
∂S
∂c1
= −2
n∑
i=1
(yi − (c1 + c2xi)) = 0
∂S
∂c2
= −2
n∑
i=1
xi(yi − (c1 + c2xi)) = 0
Often the estimates of the true parameters are represented by α and β.
Substituting α and β for c1 and c2 respectively the above equation become
n∑
i=1
(yi − (α+ βxi)) = 0
n∑
i=1
xi(yi − (α+ βxi)) = 0
Suppressing the summation bounds while distributing the summation we
have
nα+ β
∑
xi =
∑
yi
α
∑
xi + β
∑
x2i =
∑
xiyi
Solving for β and α, in terms of β, we have
β =
n
∑
xiyi −
∑
xi
∑
yi
n
∑
x2i − (
∑
xi)2
=
∑
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)∑
(xi − x¯)2 =
σxy
σ2x
(2.4)
α =
1
n
(∑
yi − β
∑
xi
)
= y¯ − βx¯ (2.5)
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where x¯ and y¯ are means, σxy is the covariance between x and y and σ
2
x is
the variance of x.
x¯ =
1
n
∑
xi y¯ =
1
n
∑
yi.
Weighted least squares Once again we use a linear model identical to Equa-
tion (2.2). The first change we note are the weights wi, i = 1, . . . , n and∑n
i=1wi = 1. Similarly to Equation (2.3) we seek to minimise an Equation
now weighted by wi.
Sw =
n∑
i=1
wi (yi − (c1 + c2xi))2 (2.6)
Differentiating Equation (2.6) with respect to c1 and c2, and substituting
α and β for c1 and c2 respectively we obtain the equations
n∑
i=1
wi(yi − (α+ βxi)) = 0
n∑
i=1
wixi(yi − (α+ βxi)) = 0
Suppressing the summation bounds while distributing the summation we
have
α
∑
wi + β
∑
wixi =
∑
wiyi
α
∑
wixi + β
∑
wix
2
i =
∑
wixiyi
Solving for β and α, in terms of β, we have
β =
∑
wi(xi − x¯w)(yi − y¯w)∑
wi(xi − x¯w)2 =
σ
(w)
xy
σ
2(w)
x
, (2.7)
α = y¯w − βx¯w (2.8)
where x¯w and y¯w are weighted means, σ
(w)
xy is the weighted covariance
between x and y and σ
2(w)
x is the weighted variance of x
x¯w =
∑
wixi∑
wi
y¯w =
∑
wiyi∑
wi
.
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We can now calculate alpha for both the OLS and WLS regressions. The regres-
sion equations are given as
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + i,t, i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i,t), (OLS) (2.9)
and
√
wtri,t =
√
wt(α
′
i + β
′
irm,t + i,t), i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i,t), (WLS) (2.10)
where
ri,t = return of fund i for time period t,
αi, α
′
i = abnormal return of fund i,
βi, β
′
i = sensitivity of fund i to changes in the market,
rm,t = return of the market portfolio or benchmark,
and
√
wt = normalised inverse CSV with respect to
the time period associated with t.
While considering Equations (2.5) and (2.4) in Remark 2.1, re-write beta as a func-
tion of the correlation between x and y as follows
β =
σxy
σ2x
(
note: ρxy =
σxy
σxσy
)
= ρxy
σy
σx
. (2.11)
Defining x¯ and y¯ as the means of x and y respectively, σxy as the covariance between
x and y, σ2x and σ
2
y the variances of x and y respectively and ρxy the correlation
between x and y. This equation helps us explain the relationship between beta and
correlation. Fixing
σy
σx
we see that there is a direct relationship between correlation
and beta. Substituting Equation (2.11) for beta into Equation (2.5):
α = y¯ − ρxy σy
σx
x¯. (2.12)
Ceteris paribus we note the effect of a change in correlation on OLS alpha in Table 2.2
Tab. 2.2: Table demonstrating the effect of correlation on alpha
Correlation Effect on Alpha
ρxy → −1 α→ y¯ + σyσx x¯
ρxy = 0 α = y¯
ρxy → 1 α→ y¯ − σyσx x¯
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These effects of correlation on alpha are mimicked in the weighted least squares
case.
We still haven’t considered what happens to alpha when CSV is taken into
account. We expected that weighting the regression by CSV would impact the value
of alpha and for some funds, cause a change in their alpha ranking relative to other
funds. We chose to analyse the effect of CSV on alpha numerically by computing
alpha in three different cases. The next section of this chapter deals with the analysis
and interpretation of various simulated market alphas.
2.2 Analysis of Simulated Data
Of all the simulated data, alpha is our primary focus in this section. Before we look
at alpha we need to consider the effect of the choice of the drifts and volatilities in
the stock price generator as these contribute to larger (or smaller) CSV. In these
simulations we considered fixed and random volatilities and drifts. The method
for choosing the random drifts and volatilities laid out in Table 2.1 implies that we
have fixed the range from which the drifts and volatilities are chosen. The underlying
assumption being that we can only observe stocks with drifts between aµ and aµ+bµ
and volatilities between aσ and aσ + bσ. To further cement the idea that drift and
volatility can generate CSV we create two hypothetical (extreme) stocks, H and L.
Stock H has a drift of aµ + bµ (the maximum possible) and stock L a drift of aµ
(the minimum possible) if their volatilities are the same, their drifts will generate a
return opportunity set which will create CSV. Alternatively we could generate H and
L with the same drifts and different volatilities. This time round their volatilities
would create a return opportunity set, producing CSV. As a closing point to this
example, it is logical to assume that any mixture (as long as the stocks aren’t the
same) of drifts and volatilities to create different stocks would create multiple return
opportunities and hence CSV.
We now consider three market scenarios: Perfectly correlated stocks with the
same drifts and volatilities, Randomly correlated stocks with the same drifts and
volatilities and Randomly correlated stocks with different drifts and volatilities.
Case 1: Perfectly correlated stocks with the same drifts and volatilities
In a market where stocks are perfectly correlated and have the same drift and volat-
ilities we expect all stocks to react the same way to any new information. If a
shock occurs in the market all the stocks will trend in the same direction. In this
case all stocks are identical to one another (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). An
investor would be indifferent when stock picking. It is not possible for any stock to
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out-perform the benchmark. Essentially, the benchmark is identical to any of the
stocks. Like the benchmark, any funds constructed from this universe of stocks will
be identical to any of the individual stocks. In all the simulations CSV was calcu-
lated using the stock returns. Because there is no stock return opportunity set CSV
should theoretically be zero. CSV is very close to zero because we cannot decompose
a perfectly correlated martix using Cholesky decomposition, however the matrix we
have decomposed is slightly offset from the perfect correlation matrix. When com-
paring the adjusted alpha to the unadjusted alpha in Figure 2.1 we saw that there
was no difference between them. We noted that adjusting the regression by CSV
did not change alpha and that none of the funds ranks changed. In Figure 2.2 we
observe positively skewed alpha, due to the way in which the stocks and funds were
constructed. It’s also clear that the unadjusted alpha and adjusted alpha histogram
are identical, a feature of the perfectly correlated market.
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Fig. 2.1: Alpha computed from a market with perfectly positively correlated stocks
with the same drifts and volatilities
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Fig. 2.2: Alpha histogram computed from a market with perfectly positively cor-
related stocks with the same drifts and volatilities
Case 2: Randomly correlated stocks with the same drifts and volatilities
The only difference between this case and the first was the choice to use randomly
correlated stocks (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A), and hence we retain the drifts and
volatilities from the first case. If this is the new scenario then the change to a ran-
domly correlated stock universe should produce CSV and cause a difference between
adjusted and unadjusted alpha. In this market, under- and out-performance are
observable however CSV is generated strictly by the correlation of the stocks. Thus
the funds constructed from this universe of stocks can out-perform the benchmark
and achieve a larger positive alpha (unlike in the first case). It is also possible for
funds to match the benchmarks performance or even under-perform. Changing the
correlation introduced a wider return opportunity set into the market. The wider
return set induced a larger CSV. When we studied the alphas in Figure 2.3 we noted
that there were several value-wise changes in alpha as well as fund rank changes.
An interpretation of rank changes, says that several funds actually have better (or
worse) alpha than the OLS regression originally suggested. Figure 2.4 shows alpha is
symmetrically dispersed around zero and that adjusted alpha is less dispersed than
unadjusted alpha.
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Fig. 2.3: Alpha computed from a market with randomly correlated stocks with the
same drifts and volatilities
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Fig. 2.4: Alpha histogram computed from a market with randomly correlated
stocks with the same drifts and volatilities
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Both case one and two are poor representations of reality, these examples helped
us demonstrate the effect of correlation on CSV and alpha. In any real world market
there exists correlations as well as varying drifts and volatilities. We now simulate
a market scenario with randomly correlated stocks that have different drifts and
volatilities (see Figure A.3 in Appendix A).
Case 3: Randomly correlated stocks with different drifts and volatilities
This scenario is as close as our model gets to a real market however all the simplifying
assumptions move us further away from reality. We have retained the correlation
matrix from the previous case. Letting the drifts and volatilities vary per stock
introduced additional CSV. Benchmark out performance, under performance and
no performance were all possibilities in this case (like in case 2). We observed a
larger opportunity set of stock returns because of the varied drifts and volatilities
on top of the random correlation structure. Figure 2.6 demonstrates that alpha is
symmetrically dispersed around zero and that adjusted alpha is less dispersed than
unadjusted alpha. The tails of the unadjusted alpha are longer than the tails of
adjusted alpha.
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Fig. 2.5: Alpha computed from a market with randomly correlated stocks with
different drifts and volatilities
2.2 Analysis of Simulated Data 16
−0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Histogram of Alpha for Case 3
Alpha
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
 
Unadjusted
Adjusted
Fig. 2.6: Alpha histogram computed from a market with randomly correlated
stocks with different drifts and volatilities
To explain why the adjusted and unadjusted alpha histograms are so similar
in Figure 2.6 and less so in Figure 2.4 consider the following: For the unadjusted
alpha, all of the weights are 1/250 = 0.004. So the more concentrated the weights
are around that number, the closer the adjusted alpha will be to the unadjusted
one. Comparing Figure 2.7 to Figure 2.8 it is clear why case three is worse than
case two in terms of dispersion the weights are definitely centered at 0.004 in case
three, while they’re centered away from 0.004 in case two. This is totally an artifact
of the random market we have simulated. Of course other simulated markets would
have different weight distributions.
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Fig. 2.7: Weight distribution computed from a market with randomly correlated
stocks with the same drifts and volatilities
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Fig. 2.8: Weight distribution computed from a market with randomly correlated
stocks with different drifts and volatilities
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Perfect fund simulation using Case 3 data
In the last example of this section we demonstrate the effect of CSV on a perfect
fund compared to the effect of CSV on non-perfect funds. Firstly, we defined a
perfect fund as one which beats the benchmark at every point in time. In order for
a fund to beat its benchmark consistently the manager must have the highest level
of skill possible. The manager must also actively trade continuously. Conversely,
non-perfect funds experience random return paths which can move above and below
the benchmark. In this setting non-perfect funds are actively managed. We then
generated 1000 non-perfect funds and chose those funds whose unadjusted alphas’
were closest to the perfect fund’s alpha (0.5% different from the perfect alpha). We
then inspected the price path plots to check whether the alpha constraint detected
similar funds correctly. It is clear from Figure A.4 that the price path of the perfect
fund dominates the benchmark at every point in time. It is also evident that the
similar funds have paths which move in tandem with the perfect fund. From the
price plot we observed that one fund behaved very differently however its alpha
was still close to the perfect alpha. Computing alphas for both the perfect fund
and similar funds we obtained Figure 2.9. In the plot fund one is the perfect fund
and the rest are non-perfect funds. The perfect fund’s alpha did not change in this
example however all the other non-perfect funds experienced an alpha change when
moving from unadjusted to adjusted alpha.
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Fig. 2.9: Plot of perfect alpha (fund 1) in comparison to several similar non-perfect
funds. Alphas are annualised.
In a real world situation it is highly unlikely to observe such a perfect fund. Thus
we can only observe funds’ whose alphas either increase or decrease after adjusting
for CSV. We know that no change in alpha after adjusting for CSV indicates the
perfect fund implying that alphas which change the least after adjusting for CSV
should represent the best funds. Note that if fund A experienced a change in alpha
of 0.1% and fund B experienced a change in alpha of −0.1% it is unclear which fund
is better although choosing a fund which consistently obtains alpha across different
CSV environments would be ideal.
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Tab. 2.3: Table of detailed regression data from perfect fund example
Table of regression variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
α 0.0488 0.0493 0.0482 0.0482 0.0489 0.0481 0.0482 0.0492
αw 0.0488 0.0454 0.0510 0.0579 0.0529 0.0350 0.0581 0.0453
β 1.0000 0.6226 0.6688 -0.3200 0.7797 0.5349 1.1666 0.8610
βw 1.0000 0.6279 0.6569 -0.2618 0.7843 0.5711 1.1588 0.8737
x¯ 0.1186 0.1186 0.1186 0.1186 0.1186 0.1186 0.1186 0.1186
x¯w 0.1079 0.1079 0.1079 0.1079 0.1079 0.1079 0.1079 0.1079
y¯ 0.1674 0.1232 0.1276 0.0103 0.1413 0.1115 0.1866 0.1514
y¯w 0.1567 0.1132 0.1218 0.0296 0.1375 0.0966 0.1831 0.1396
σx 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524
σ
(w)
x 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031
σy 0.0524 0.0560 0.0677 0.0677 0.0719 0.0559 0.0827 0.0750
σ
(w)
y 0.0031 0.0035 0.0041 0.0041 0.0044 0.0035 0.0050 0.0046
σxy 0.6854 0.4267 0.4584 -0.2193 0.5343 0.3666 0.7995 0.5901
σ
(w)
xy 0.0024 0.0015 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0019 0.0014 0.0028 0.0021
ρxy 1.0000 0.5816 0.5169 -0.2475 0.5679 0.5011 0.7386 0.6009
ρ
(w)
xy 1.0000 0.5545 0.4943 -0.1970 0.5526 0.4994 0.7190 0.5900
Taking the perfect example further we calculated annualised values for all the
regression variables used in the perfect alpha example. Column one of Table 2.3 de-
tails the regression of the perfect fund and columns two to eight represent regression
results of the non-perfect funds. The correlation of the perfect fund to the bench-
mark is one because the perfect fund’s path is calculated using the benchmark’s path
as a reference. We used Table 2.3 and Equation (2.12) to discern which variables
may have caused alpha to change. Because all the variables responded to the WLS
regression it was not clear that any particular variable contributed significantly to
a change in alpha.
2.3 Simulation findings
The purpose of this Chapter was to expose any uncertainties surrounding alpha and
CSV while working in a controlled system. What happens to alpha when all the
stocks are perfectly correlated? What does CSV do when we vary the correlation
between stocks? How does CSV affect alpha in a system where all the parameters
are known? We answered these questions by designing an idealistic market with a
simple model of stocks and stock picking. It was clear from the plots examined in
Section 2.2 that alpha was changed by WLS regressions. It was also evident that
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correlation affected the magnitude of the change in alpha. We saw no noticeable
change in alpha in the market with perfect correlation, when comparing OLS alpha
to WLS alpha. Correlation affects the closeness of stock returns, which in turn
shrinks the size of the stock return opportunity set. CSV used in this idealistic
model was based off of stock returns and represents the opportunity set of these
returns. We can therefore state that the higher the correlation, the lower the CSV.
If all stocks are highly correlated then no combination of stocks will out-perform
any other, including the benchmark (a weighted combination of all the stocks). If
this is true then none of the funds constructed from this idealistic stock universe
will achieve alpha when correlation is high. We also established that CSV leads to
alpha. If CSV is very close to zero then alpha becomes harder to obtain as there
is a smaller return opportunity set. Funds which obtain higher alpha in a low CSV
environment show a higher level of managerial skill than those with lower alpha.
The same can be said for a high CSV environment although it is easier to obtain
alpha when CSV is high. WLS regressions will decrease or increase alpha. This
depends on the CSV environment which the fund exists in. If there is no change in
alpha the fund is perfect.
In the Chapters which follow we analyse and test real world data.
Chapter 3
Framework for Analysis and
Data Collection
In this chapter we build a framework for fund data selection. We then select the
fund data on the basis of this framework and end the chapter by describing the
difficulties experienced with this data.
3.1 Cross-sectional Volatility in South Africa
The history of cross-sectional volatility (CSV) in South Africa is a short albeit an
interesting one. CSV is a new concept thus many fund managers are still conducting
research on the subject. The CSV data used in this research was captured between
July 2002 and July 2012, for the ALSI, Top40, Resi20, Indi20, Fini25, MidCap, and
SmallCap indices. In Figure 3.1 we consider setting wit =
1
Nt
in Equation (1.3), or
equivalently uniformly weighting CSV1. We make the following observations: The
Resi20 is the most volatile of the indices with spikes between July 2002 and July
2008, after which it settles post the 2008 crash, picking up again in the past year. The
Resi20 also had the highest observed CSV at 25.96% in 2008. The Fini15 featured
the lowest CSV for the period under observation, with a minimum of 1.47% in 2011.
Looking at all the indices we find that CSV was highly volatile before 2008. From
2008 to early 2012, we see that CSV declined across all sectors and rose again in
2013.
1 The values plotted are the square-root of Equation (1.3).
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Fig. 3.1: Uniformly weighted CSV
Following the analysis of uniform CSV, we turned to market capitalisation weighted
CSV visible in Figure 3.2. We see similar trends to the uniform weighting basis.
Fini15 still produces the lowest CSV results on average throughout the period, with
a minimum of 1.24% in 2011. Resi20 has smaller CSV values due to its proportion-
ately larger market capitalisation weightings. SmallCap dominates with the largest
average CSV, with a maximum of 21.74% (due to its proportionately smaller mar-
ket capitalisation). The range of CSV values throughout the observation window is
smaller when taking into account market capitalisation. We still see a trend of high
variability in years prior 2008, and decreased variability post 2008, similar to the
uniform case.
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Fig. 3.2: Market capitalisation weighted CSV
Further interest revolves around the global decline of CSV experienced in 2008.
Every sector was effected by the crash, all featuring a decline in share value sim-
ultaneously. When share prices dropped, all of them dropped over the same time
window thus decreasing the CSV (the dispersion between stocks). This behaviour
continued till late 2011. Between January 2012 and April 2013, CSV has increased
because some sectors have recovered, while others are still recovering.
Finally, having visually assessed figures 3.1 and 3.2 we were able to make a
tentative decision on the appropriate time windows on which to perform the analysis.
The primary factor behind our choice of analysis periods was the behaviour of CSV
between 2002 and 2013. Both periods chosen exhibited stable CSV over time. Hence,
the inability to use the period between January 2008 and December 2010 where
CSV was highly negatively correlated over time. The time windows we chose were
1 January 2006 to 31 December 2007 (2 years), referred to as Time Window 1, and
1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012 (2 years), referred to as Time Window 2.
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3.2 Data description
For this research we acquired monthly fund price data for 16 retail funds, of which
only six were usable. The funds were required to have a low cash and a majority
equity holding. The availability of data and the choice of Time Window 1 and Time
Window 2 forced us to work with only six of the 16 retail funds (see Table 3.1
for the chosen list of retail funds). The low cash, high equity holding requirement
ensured the presence of dispersion between funds. As an example, consider two funds
with large cash holdings (40%) and calculate their dispersion. This dispersion is far
smaller compared to funds with majority equity holdings. One further driver for the
decision to work with low cash funds presents itself in the paper by de Silva et al.
(2001) which states that a link exists between fund return dispersion and security
returns, not cash.
Tab. 3.1: Usable retail funds
Retail Funds
Fund Name Bloomberg Code
Allan Gray Equity Fund ALEQTYF
Coronation Top 20 Fund CORTP20
Investec Active Quants INVINDX
Kagiso Top 40 Tracker Fund CORALSI
Momentum Equity Fund RMBEQTY
Prudential Equity Fund PRUOPTM
In addition to the retail funds, Alexander Forbes provided us with a data set
of historical institutional fund returns. From the data set we chose 12 funds (see
Table 3.2) which matched the criteria previously stated. For each fund, retail and
institutional we collected a nominated benchmark2 returns.
2 A nominated benchmark is the benchmark contractually assigned to the fund when it is created.
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Tab. 3.2: Usable institutional funds
Institutional funds
Cadiz Equity SWIX
Coronation Core Equity
Investec Active Quants
Investment Solutions Pure Equity
Prudential Core Equity ALSI
Prudential Core Equity SWIX
Stanlib Core Equity
Investec Equity
ABSA Asset Management Core Equity
Fraters Equity
Coronation Houseview Equity
Prescient Equity Quant Fund
For the purpose of further analysis we gathered monthly price data for sector
indices i.e. the TOP40, RESI20, INDI25, FINI15, STEFI and ALBIP defined in
Table B.1 (used in the calculation of a proxy benchmark, see Section 4.5). The
final data set attained was monthly ALSI CSV data, both uniform and market
capitalisation weighted (see Chapter 3).
3.3 Data difficulties
The first problem we encountered was that of missing data. All funds with missing
data were excluded from the analysis. The exclusion of funds with missing data was
a necessary step to ensure the regressions were calculable.
The institutional data provided by Alexander Forbes presented us with an an-
omaly of positive alpha across all the funds. Through the regressions in Section 4.3
we found that no matter the time window, or fund, we always received a positive
alpha figure. In Chapter 4 we consider two ideas to correct for this anomaly: Firstly,
the proxy benchmark, i.e. solving a tracking error minimisation problem (see Sec-
tion 4.5) and the zero-sum method (see Section 4.4). Thus, the alpha estimates
in this research are not a pure representation of the Alexander Forbes institutional
data.
The final issue worth noting, is selection bias. As mentioned earlier in this
chapter, we chose 16 retail funds, however 10 of them did not have data in the
chosen time windows. Consequently, we were left with six retail funds. Similarly for
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the institutional funds, we were left with 12 funds. We created a selection bias by
excluding funds which did not have data in the time period over which we performed
the analysis.
Chapter 4
Methodology
In this chapter, we explain the method we followed for alpha estimation, along with
a test for heteroskedasticity. We also explain how alpha was re-estimated using a
cross-sectional volatility (CSV) adjustment. We close off this chapter by discussing
two new concepts, namely the zero-sum alpha and the proxy benchmark.
4.1 Why test for heteroskedasticity?
We test for the presence of heteroskedasticity because it biases the variance of estim-
ates, therefore regressions between predictors (the benchmark return) and outcomes
(the fund return) will yield biased relationships. As an example, the p-value for
testing whether the slope term (beta) is significantly different from zero can be
misinterpreted when the data are heteroskedastic.
In the exploratory analysis of the return data we investigated scatter plots of
benchmark return versus fund return. Informally we determined whether hetero-
skedasticity was present in the data by studying these scatter plots for wedge-like
shapes. These wedge formations indicate increasing variance between predictors and
outcomes. Formally we tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan hypo-
thesis test clearly defined by Breusch and Pagan (1979). In linear regression, using
the model Yi = θ1 + θ2Xi + i, assuming i ∼ N(0, σ2i ). Here Yi is the return vector
of fund i, Xi is the nominated benchmark return vector of fund i, i is the residual
error vector for fund i and θ1 and θ2 are the intercept and slope of linear regression
respectively. Perform the following steps:
1. Estimate the model by ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and obtain the
residuals {ˆ1, ˆ2, . . . }.
2. Estimate the variance of these residuals i.e. σˆ2i =
∑
2i
(n−2) . The vector i has n
elements, and n− 2 is a degrees of freedom adjustment to n. Note that σˆ2i is
a scalar quantity.
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3. Run the regression
2i
σˆ2i
= κ1 + κ2Xi + εi and compute the explained sums of
squares (ESS) from this regression.
4. Reject the hypothesis of homoskedasticity in favour of heteroskedasticity if
ESS
2 > χ
2(α=0.01)
ν=1 . The null and alternative hypothesis are defined as follows:
H0 : Homoskedasticity present
H1 : Heteroskedasticity present
The Breusch-Pagan hypothesis test is a form of statistical inference. We use it to
draw conclusions about the population on data sampled from the population. The
test is designed so that the null hypothesis is the least favoured outcome, however
it is not necessarily rejected. We choose to reject or accept a hypothesis on the
basis of evidence found in the data by comparing the test statistic to the theoretical
value of that test statistic (with some level of significants). In our case we used
an inequality which compares the Breusch-Pagan test statistic to a theoretical Chi-
Squared statistic (see above).
4.2 Testing for Heteroskedasticity
Firstly, we inspected the scatter plots (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) of fund return versus
benchmark return. We observed a linear relationship between fund returns and
their nominated benchmarks (see Figure 4.1, CORALSI). For further insight into
why this was the case, consider Remark 4.1 regarding trading strategies. Comparing
Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.2 we saw decreased linearity between dependent and inde-
pendent variables moving from Time Window 1 to Time Window 2. Using only the
plots we could not conclude with certainty that heteroskedasticity was present in the
return data. Thus we proceeded with the Breusch-Pagan Test for heteroskedasticity.
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Fig. 4.1: Scatter plot of fund return vs. benchmark return for window 1 for retail
funds, unadjusted
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Fig. 4.2: Scatter plot of fund return vs. benchmark return for window 2 for retail
funds, unadjusted
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Remark 4.1 (Trading Strategies). To understand why there is a strong relation
between retail fund returns and their benchmarks we first need to define two types
of investment strategies:
Active Trading The primary goal of active management is benchmark out per-
formance (positive alpha). Skill levels, active fund performance, and new
information are closely monitored by all market participants making it dif-
ficult to exploit market inefficiencies (if they ever existed in the first place).
In active funds we see more human involvement than in the passive style.
As a result of more human oversight active fund management is a costly
and more risky style of management than passive management. As a con-
sequence of higher risks active funds are more likely to yield higher abnor-
mal returns than passive strategies.
Passive Trading In passive trading strategies, managers are concerned with
benchmark tracking. Passive strategies are cheaper than active strategies
due to a lower human participation factor. Passive funds bear a larger pro-
portion of benchmark risk as the majority of idiosyncratic risk is diversified
away. Unfortunately, the lower risk through diversification will ultimately
produce lower absolute returns, however, lower management costs results
in a better (relative) net effect than in the actively managed alternative.
This makes sense because active fund managers experience much larger
costs which they have to overcome before any profits can be realised.
The majority of retail funds follow a passive trading strategy and thus have a
mandate to track their nominated benchmark as closely as possible creating the
linear relationship we have already alluded to.
Performing the Breusch-Pagan test on the retail funds we attained the results
seen in Table 4.1.
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Tab. 4.1: Results from the Breusch-Pagan hypothesis test for heteroskedasticity
Test for Heteroskedasticity Unadjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
ALEQTYF Reject H0 Reject H0
CORTP20 Reject H0 Reject H0
INVINDX Reject H0 Reject H0
CORALSI Reject H0 Fail to Reject H0
RMBEQTY Reject H0 Reject H0
PRUOPTM Reject H0 Reject H0
These results provided a clearer picture regarding heteroskedasticity. Looking at
Time Window 1 we noted that all funds in the window rejected H0. In Time Win-
dow 2 we noted that only CORALSI failed to reject H0, while all other funds in the
window rejected H0. A reminder again, that in this test we wanted to reject H0 as
this was the hypothesis of homoskedasticity. From the evidence in Table 4.1 we con-
cluded that weighted least squares (WLS) was necessary because heteroskedasticity
was present in almost all the funds tested.
4.3 Performance measurements and estimation
There are several ways which fund managers can evaluate their fund’s performance
(see Remark 4.2). In OLS regression we obtain alpha (see Remark 1.1) by regressing
the return of a fund’s benchmark on the fund’s return.
Remark 4.2 (Performance Measures). We have already defined alpha, thus we
shall define a further four performance measurements commonly used in practice.
Orthogonalised Return A fund return which is independent of its benchmark,
i.e. moves in the benchmark are not reflected in the orthogonalised return.
We observe orthogonalised returns as the error components of the OLS
regression.
Relative Return A measure of fund performance, determined by subtracting a
funds benchmark from a funds return. Mathematically,
RRFund = RFund −RBenchmark.
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Active fund managers aim to maximise relative return, while passive port-
folio strategies require the relative return to be as close to zero as possible.
Positive relative returns imply benchmark out performance, and negative
relative returns imply that a fund has under performed the benchmark. Re-
lative return is often used to describe the skill of a fund manager, however
it does not provide an indication of the risk which the manager has taken
on. In this case one would consult the information ratio, a risk adjusted
performance measure taking volatility into account.
Sharpe Ratio A performance measurement meaningfully implemented when
funds contain more than two securities. To compute the Sharpe ratio we
use the equation
S =
E[RP −RF ]
σP
, (4.1)
where RP is the return of a portfolio, RF is the risk free rate of return,
σP is the volatility of the portfolio and E[RP −RF ] is the expected excess
return of the portfolio relative to the risk free rate. Holding σP constant,
portfolios with higher Sharpe ratios are more attractive to investors because
they provide higher excess returns for the same level of risk.
Information Ratio Different from the Sharpe ratio, the information ratio uses
the benchmark return to calculate expected excess returns. The information
ratio is frequently used by analysts to gauge the skill of fund managers.
Unlike relative return , the information ratio encompasses the amount of
risk the manager has taken on. It is important to correctly choose the
benchmark as this can misrepresent the information ratio by either over or
under estimating excess returns. We calculate the information ratio using
the equation
IR =
E[Rp −Rb]
σp
, (4.2)
where Rp is the return of a portfolio, Rb is the benchmark return, σp is the
standard deviation of excess returns and E[Rp−Rf ] is the expected excess
return of the portfolio relative to the benchmark.
We estimate these parameters using the model,
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + i,t, i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i,t), (4.3)
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where
ri,t = return of security i for time period t,
αi = abnormal return of security i,
βi = sensitivity of security i to changes in the market
and
rm,t = return of the market portfolio.
This alternative to the market model, introduced in Chapter 1, simplifies calculation
and references pure returns instead of premiums above the risk free rate. Note that
the returns ri,t are calculated on a monthly basis in a relative fashion.
Application of WLS will either completely remove the presence of heteroskedasti-
city or reduce its effect. The weighting we chose was the annualised normalised CSV
of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange All Share Index (ALSI). We explain the
choice of this particular weighting after the mathematical formulation of WLS,
√
wtri,t =
√
wt(α¯i + β¯irm,t + i,t), i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i,t). (4.4)
where
α¯i = abnormal return of security i,
β¯i = sensitivity of security i to changes in the market
and
√
wt = annualised normalised inverse CSV applying
over the time period associated with t.
Note that we are now weighting the input variables ri,t and rm,t by
√
wt from Equa-
tion (4.3) thus performing WLS regression.
A noteworthy problem with WLS is that the choice of weighting has a big impact
on the coefficients of regression. We have in this procedure chosen the ALSI CSV
as we deem this most appropriate for the types of funds we were considering. An
argument could be made for fund CSV rather than ALSI CSV, however the unavail-
ability of fund CSV forced us towards the ALSI. Because we have chosen the ALSI
we are also considering a market average CSV, one which is not style specific and
thus the adjustment we make (through weightings) is not as accurate as using the
sector or fund specific CSV.
All the techniques discussed above were applied to the available retail funds to
produce interpretable performance measures which are analysed in Chapter 5. In
the next two sections we define the zero-sum alpha and proxy benchmarks.
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4.4 Zero-sum alphas
During the exploratory analysis phase of this research, while calculating the insti-
tutional alphas using standard regression procedures (presented in Section 4.3), we
discovered an interesting anomaly. We found an overwhelming amount of positive
alpha and too few negative alpha over the periods of investigation. In reality, when
studying fund alphas, we should observe an even occurrence of positive and negative
alpha because not every fund can experience abnormal performance simultaneously
(This is a highly improbable notion). We could not proceed with the (globally pos-
itive alpha) return data thus we transformed it to create zero-sum alphas1. Leaving
the data untouched would produce results that poorly imitate the market as we
would observe too many positive alphas.
The zero-sum alpha helped us generate more realistic alphas for the institutional
data. In this research, zero-sum alpha acts as a substitute for the most basic alpha
produced by OLS the regression given in Equation (4.3). To create a zero-sum alpha
we implement the following procedure,
1. Using the OLS defined in Equation (4.3) we can estimate the idiosyncratic
terms, i.e. the orthogonal returns2. Restating Equation (4.3) we can perform
the following re-arrangement to calculate i,t as
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + i,t,
i,t = ri,t − αi − βirm,t. (Orthogonalisation)
2. We then use these orthogonal returns to perform a new regression
i,t = α˜i + β˜irm,t + εi,t, εi,t ∼ N(0, σ˜2i,t), (4.5)
where
i,t = orthogonal return of security i for time period t,
α˜i = abnormal return of security i
and
β˜i = sensitivity of security i to changes in the market.
1 This transformation was suggested by Daniel Polakow a derivatives specialist at Old Mutual
Investment Group South Africa.
2 See Remark 4.2
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We extract the α˜i’s from Equation (4.5). Note that the regression in Equa-
tion (4.5) is a regression of the nominated benchmark on the orthogonalised
returns of the fund.
3. Using the α˜i’s we calculate their arithmetic average, α¯ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 α˜i.
4. Lastly we compute α˙i = α˜i − α¯ for every i. These new alphas are zero-sum
alphas. That is
∑N
i=1 (α˜i − α¯) =
∑N
i=1 α˙i = 0. Note that they are centered
around zero.
These assimilated alphas (α˙i) can now be used to create a new return series for each
respective fund through reverse engineering of the regression equation as follows
r˙i,t = α˙i + βirm,t + i,t, i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i,t), (4.6)
where r˙i,t is the new return series, α˙i is the zero-sum alpha for fund i and the
remaining parameters as defined in Section 4.3. We can now apply the methodology
in this section to r˙i,t to generate the necessary results for the institutional data.
4.5 Proxy Benchmark
Similar to an investor observing fund returns we have no knowledge of the holdings
the fund managers take in the various sectors, or the method they choose to al-
locate capital to various stocks. The proxy benchmark is a benchmark constructed
using mathematical optimisation of tracking error 3 to estimate these proportional
holdings. We then apply these proportions to their associated index, summing the
weighted indices together to form the proxy benchmark. Using the sector indices lis-
ted in Chapter 3.2, let Fi represent index i’s returns and wi be the weighting of Fi in
the proxy benchmark. Then RProxy =
∑
i Fiwi is used in the following optimisation
procedure:
min
wi
TE2Fund =
[∑N
j=1 (RFund −RProxy)2
]
N − 1 ,
with constraints
6∑
i=1
wi = 1
and
0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 ∀i,
3 See Remark 4.3 for a full definition of tracking error.
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where Fi, RFund, RProxy are vectors of returns, wi is a scalar and N is the number
of elements in RFund. We have essentially minimised the tracking error by choosing
optimal weightings in each of the sector indices to construct our proxy benchmark
return. This benchmark allows us to create alphas similar to those found in passive
strategies 4, where the fund return follows the benchmark as close as possible with
the aim of minimising tracking error.
Remark 4.3 (Tracking Error). A metric which measures how closely a fund
tracks its benchmark (closeness of a fund and its benchmark), usually an index
in the same market as the fund. Passive funds tend to have lower tracking
errors, conversely, active funds have higher tracking errors. Tracking error is
mathematically defined as:
TE =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(rp,t − rb,t), (4.7)
where TE2 is tracking error variance, N the number of observations, rp,t and
rb,t are the portfolio and benchmark return over time period t, respectively. A
more tractable definition of tracking error variance follows,
TE2 = (βp − 1)2σ2b + σ2 , (4.8)
where βp is the beta of the fund, σb is the benchmarks volatility and σ
2
 is the
idiosyncratic fund risk. From equation (4.8) we note that tracking error can
be incurred in one of three ways: (i) through beta alignment (βp = 1), leaving
only idiosyncratic risk (σ2 > 0); (ii) through beta misalignment (βp 6= 1) and
the absence of idiosyncratic risk (σ2 = 0); or (iii) a combination of beta risk
(βp 6= 1) and idiosyncratic risk (σ2 > 0).
4 See Remark 4.1 for detail on trading strategies.
Chapter 5
Interpretation of results
In this chapter we interpret all available results from the regressions. This includes
model fit statistic R-square1 and the various return measures discussed in Chapter 4.
We also consider methods for measuring whether or not there were any changes in
alpha when taking cross-sectional volatility (CSV) into account, i.e. ranking-wise
and value-wise changes of alpha.
5.1 Model quality
How well does our choice of model fit the data? This question is answered using
the coefficient of determination. Firstly, we compute R-squared for the unadjusted
regression and observe the values in Table 5.1. For Time Window 1, it is clear that
the R-squared value is at an acceptable level. It is also evident that Time Window
1 is fitted better than Time Window 2, for every fund. As an example, a fund with
an R-squared of 0.7, means that 70% of the funds movements can be explained by
movements in the benchmark.
Tab. 5.1: R-squared for OLS regression (Retail)
R-Squared Unadjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
ALEQTYF 0.70616 0.57256
CORTP20 0.63837 0.55078
INVINDX 0.78778 0.35538
CORALSI 0.94023 0.50588
RMBEQTY 0.79446 0.48594
PRUOPTM 0.73227 0.67633
1 See Remark 5.1 for a definition.
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Note that R-squared does not tell us about the performance of the fund, however
it does tell us about the correlation between the fund and its associated benchmark.
The higher the value of R-squared the more the fund’s performance patterns can be
explained by the performance of its benchmark. The weakest relationship presents
itself in Time Window 2 for INVINDX indicating that this fund did not track its
benchmark too closely during that time period. The same can be said for all R-
square values below 70% as this is a suitable cut-off, see Remark 5.1.
Remark 5.1 (Coefficient of Determination). The coefficient of determination
is often referred to as R-squared or R2. Mathematically we define R-Squared as
R2 = 1− SSres
SStot
,
where SSres is the sum of squares of residuals and SStot is the total sum of
squares. R-squared tells us how well the model fits the data, the higher the
value of R-squared the better the model fits the data and visa versa. When
is the R-squared value high enough? The choice of the cut-off depends on the
consequences it may have in the research. If the consequences of choosing the
cut-off are severe we choose a large R-squared value enforcing a strong model
fit. If the consequences are minor we choose a smaller cut-off, showing lenience
towards a weaker model fit. Hence the choice of 70% as a suitable cut-off.
Tab. 5.2: R-squared for WOLS regression (Retail)
R-Squared Adjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
ALEQTYF 0.73265 0.56726
CORTP20 0.62030 0.53036
INVINDX 0.76982 0.33753
CORALSI 0.93415 0.49133
RMBEQTY 0.78349 0.47203
PRUOPTM 0.69915 0.66243
After performing the weighted least squares (WLS) we found that there were
improvements (seen in Table 5.2), although Time Window 1 still showed stronger
correlations than Time Window 2. Because the WLS removed performance noise
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we saw that some of the R-squared values changed, although none changed signific-
antly (±1% throughout). For the most part retail ordinary least squares (OLS) and
WLS models were well suited for the data, with some disappointing results in Time
Window 2, a feature of market instability in the period (and recovery). Expanding
on this point we note that when a regression model is poorly fit by data, R-square
values will typically be low (≤ 0.5). Thus when the market is unstable (recovering
or crashing) we observe data extrema which cannot be predicted by the regression
model, producing a poor data fit and hence the low R-squared values.
Tab. 5.3: R-squared for OLS regression (Institutional)
R-Squared Unadjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Fund 1 0.94569 0.89482
Fund 2 0.95533 0.94417
Fund 3 0.89876 0.88741
Fund 4 0.98176 0.94980
Fund 5 0.96203 0.98104
Fund 6 0.96562 0.96613
Fund 7 0.93389 0.95171
Fund 8 0.86766 0.93422
Fund 9 0.96077 0.93899
Fund 10 0.73090 0.90613
Fund 11 0.92563 0.93457
Fund 12 0.99718 0.91894
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Tab. 5.4: R-squared for WOLS regression (Institutional)
R-Squared Adjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Fund 1 0.93433 0.41381
Fund 2 0.95183 0.44568
Fund 3 0.90536 0.45484
Fund 4 0.98146 0.44725
Fund 5 0.96022 0.44538
Fund 6 0.96252 0.45390
Fund 7 0.92978 0.46416
Fund 8 0.85039 0.41265
Fund 9 0.95760 0.45191
Fund 10 0.68730 0.43752
Fund 11 0.92320 0.43935
Fund 12 0.99675 0.46798
Having performed the exact same R-squared calculations on institutional data
(Tables 5.3 and 5.4), we observed R-squared values in excess of 90% for the OLS
regression in Time Windows 1 and 2, and under WLS regression we noted disap-
pointing results (R-squared values less than 50%) in Time Window 2. For any given
time window or regression no fund had a dominating R-squared. This is owing
to the similarity between the various funds (primarily equity based, low cash) and
their market performance during the time periods. Throughout all the institutional
R-squared values, the largest change lay between OLS Time Window 2 and WLS
Time Window 2 where R-squared moved from values in excess of 90% to values less
than 50%. This large change in R-squared indicated that the model quality of OLS
was better than WLS for Time Window 2.
5.2 Alpha interpretation
In this section we analyse all alphas produced by the regressions defined in Chapter 4.
Note that for the institutional data we have calculated zero-sum alphas (see Sec-
tion 4.4) as our raw alpha. We then apply the WLS regression to calculate CSV
adjusted alphas, the core purpose of this research. Finally, we consider the implic-
ations of a proxy benchmark (defined in Section 4.5) and its impact on both raw
alpha and CSV adjusted alpha.
Alpha provides us with a means to compare performance between fund managers
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by way of a simple ranking system, the highest alpha receiving a rank of one. Fund
ranking was the main method for comparing raw alphas to CSV adjusted alphas.
For the purpose of this analysis we have produced several tables of alpha values:
retail and institutional, raw and CSV adjusted (Tables C.1, C.2, C.3 and C.4 in
Appendix C), using graphs to simplify interpretation.
Remark 5.2 (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test). The Wilcoxon rank sum test as sug-
gested by Wild and Seber (1999) is performed using the following methodology.
In each case (for each p-value computed) we have a two samples of alphas from
two populations. Let these samples be from population A and B, containing
nA and nB observations respectively. We test the null hypothesis H0 : A = B.
Wilcoxons rank sum test tries to detect location shifts, and hence differences
in the median of A and B. Thus the alternative hypothesis can be written as
H1 : A > B, H1 : A < B or H1 : A 6= B. The test ranks the sum of nA + nB
observations of the combined sample. Each observation has a rank, the smallest
having rank 12, the largest having rank nA + nB. The test statistic for the Wil-
coxon rank sum test is the sum of the ranks for the observations from one of the
samples. For our purposes we have set the significance level at 5%.
Tab. 5.5: p-values from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for retail alpha, rejection of
H0 at 5%
Wilcoxon ranksum p-value
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Nominated benchmark 0.58874 0.58874
Proxy benchmark 0.58874 0.93723
Tab. 5.6: Comparison of the standard deviations of retail alpha
Standard deviation comparison
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Nominated benchmark 1.00831 0.98481
Proxy benchmark 2.04647 1.11711
Firstly, we studied the retail alpha, Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Visually, the biggest
alpha change appeared in Time Window 1 using the proxy benchmark. Ranking
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changes were sparse and the Wilcoxon rank sum test in all cases suggested that
there were no median differences (p-values in Table 5.5). We noted that the ratio
of alpha standard deviations3 were more pronounced in Time Window 1 for both
the nominated and proxy benchmarks (See Table 5.6). These ratios, both larger
than one, indicated that the standard deviation of alphas increased when adjusting
for CSV. The proxy benchmark produced higher alpha deviation changes in Time
Window 1 and Time Window 2. Retail alpha rankings changed, but these changes
were not statistically significant (referring to the size of the p-value of the Wilcoxon
rank sum test).
Remark 5.3 (Standard Deviation Ratio). The ratio of CSV adjusted vs. un-
adjusted alpha standard deviations mathematically,
Alpha Standard Deviation Ratio =
σα CSV adjusted
σα unadjusted
.
We have essentially constructed ratios between the standard deviations of the
various alpha groups. Note that we only calculate the standard deviation ratios
between CSV adjusted alpha and raw alpha. We therefore have four ratios per
fund type. Higher ratio values (greater than one) imply that the standard devi-
ation of a CSV adjusted alpha is larger than the standard deviation of its raw
alpha counter part. Lower ratio values (less than one) tell us that the standard
deviation of the CSV adjusted alpha is smaller than the standard deviation of
the raw alpha. This ratio tells us how sensitive the standard deviation of alpha
is to the WLS regression.
3 Refer to Remark 5.3 for more detail regarding this ratio.
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Fig. 5.1: Line plot comparing various retail alpha values in time window 1
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Fig. 5.2: Line plot comparing various retail alpha values in time window 2
Tab. 5.7: p-values from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for institutional alpha, rejec-
tion of H0 at 5%
Wilcoxon ranksum p-value
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Nominated benchmark 0.37084 0.50672
Proxy benchmark 0.17485 0.40250
Tab. 5.8: Comparison of the standard deviations of institutional alpha
Standard deviation comparison
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Nominated benchmark 2.16379 1.97356
Proxy benchmark 2.22392 1.24370
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Looking at the institutional alphas, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 we found large alpha
changes in Time Window 1 for the proxy benchmark case, across multiple funds.
In Time Window 2, large alpha changes were exhibited when using the nominated
benchmark, however only for Fund 7. Visually, all the institutional alphas remained
close together, with few shifts or changes when applying the CSV adjustment. Turn-
ing to the institutional alpha standard deviation ratios in Table 5.8 we noted high
ratio values (larger than one). This tells us that alpha deviations increased when
adjusting for CSV. For rank changes, once again we used the Wilcoxon rank sum
test, which indicated that none of the alphas (comparing nominated with nominated
and proxy with proxy) had significantly different medians, respectively. For Time
Window 1 we found funds 3, 7 and 10 achieving the largest alpha values, similarly
for Time Window 2. The institutional fund rankings also changed, however this
change was not statistically significant either.
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Fig. 5.3: Line plot comparing various institutional alpha values in time window 1
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Fig. 5.4: Line plot comparing various institutional alpha values in time window 2
With both institutional and retail alpha in mind, the proxy benchmark created
a more sensitive alpha compared to the nominated benchmark alpha. Using the
nominated benchmark, we found that even when CSV was taken into account the
alpha values were far more similar to one another, even more so in the retail envir-
onment. Without the consideration of the Wilcoxon rank sum test, turning to the
raw ranking tables (see appendix D) we can conclude that although the Wilcoxon
test did not pick up any median difference there were still rank changes present.
The impact of these rank changes should not be ignored in practice and they are
discussed briefly in the conclusion of this work.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter we conclude on our analysis, answer the research question and com-
ment on any other interesting pieces of information we have uncovered during this
investigative process. We finish with suggestions for further research.
6.1 Digressions
The choice of time window gave us exposure to the movements experienced by both
retail and institutional funds in South Africa. We ignored the spike in 2008 caused by
the crash as we believed this would create erroneous regression coefficients (namely,
alpha) by skewing the data. During the preliminary data exploration we noticed
several problems which lead to the creation of the proxy benchmark and the zero-sum
alpha1 approaches. We then had the opportunity to investigate another dimension
of the research problem. Zero-sum alphas (only for the institutional funds), centered
around zero, were more sensible alpha estimates of fund performance2. We found
that when adjusting for cross-sectional volatility (CSV), alphas derived using the
proxy benchmark were more sensitive, experiencing larger changes in comparison to
the nominated benchmark alternative. When establishing the rankings for each fund
we discovered that there were only slight differences which lead us to the Wilcoxon
rank sum test. The Wilcoxon rank sum did not detect any significant differences
between the ranks. Before consulting the rankings directly we created one final
measure to inform us, the ratio of alpha standard deviations. It was now possible
to determine whether or not cross-sectional volatility had any effect on performance
measurement.
1 See Chapter 4 for more detail on the proxy benchmark and zero-sum alpha.
2 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the positive alpha anomaly is a poor representation of the actual
market
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6.2 Does cross-sectional volatility have an effect on
performance measurement in South Africa?
Yes, CSV does have an effect on performance measurement in South Africa. Since we
were interested in measuring cross-sectional volatilities effect on fund performance
(or managerial skill) we have centered our focus on alpha. After careful consideration
of all the results we found it necessary to approach the discussion using three specific
concepts: Rank-wise changes to alpha, value-wise changes to alpha and remuneration
effects.
Firstly, considering the ranked alphas having used the Wilcoxon test we es-
tablished that there was no significant difference when moving from ordinary least
squares (OLS) to the weighted leasts squares (WLS) framework. Thus we can state
that taking CSV into account has no effect rank-wise.
As indicated in Chapter 5 the value changes of alpha cannot be ignored (even
though they are small). These value changes can still impact the remuneration of
(un)skilled fund managers. Thus when taking CSV into account the value changes
in alpha can have effect on the remuneration. A supporting example: Funds whose
alphas increased when moving from OLS to WLS regression indicate that these
managers are under compensated, and should, in-light of the larger alpha, receive
an alpha adjusted compensation. This compensation should be linked to the alpha
produced by the WLS regression. Therefore, taking CSV into account should also
effect the remuneration of fund managers. What we cannot say, is how large or
small this compensation should be. Given the results from Chapter 2 we cannot
state whether an increase or decrease in alpha is better although consistency across
different CSV environments would be ideal.
Although WLS using normalised inverse CSV did not affect the rankings of
fund alphas the value change can be attributed to the regression coefficients change.
When applying
√
wit to the standard OLS regression (See Equation (4.3)) we are
effectively discounting imprecision (See Equation (4.4)) hence the change in alpha
arises when correcting for the heteroskedastic noise. This is best explained by quot-
ing Wasserman (2006):“Trying to give equal attention to all parts of the input space
(benchmark return) is a waste of time; we should be more concerned about fitting
well where the noise is small, and expect to fit poorly where the noise is big”. In
Chapter 2 we noted that alpha dispersion decreased when adjusting for CSV how-
ever this change was not evident in the real world data. This can be attributed to
the scale of the study (lack of data) and the data problems.
Finally, CSV leads to generation of alpha. Managers cannot expect to outper-
form, or generate alpha, without the existence of CSV.
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6.3 Further research
We believe this research can be extended by considering the following list of ideas
for further research
• Measurement: Consideration of alternative skill measurement metric. In this
research we identified the characteristics of alpha for the perfect fund. We
found that CSV adjustments either increased or decreased the alpha of non-
perfect funds. We were unsuccessful in detecting rank changes of funds. As
mentioned above, CSV allows managers to obtain alpha. How would alpha
behave across different CSV regimes? If we chose a particular fund and ob-
served its CSV adjusted alpha across these regimes we could then measure the
managers consistency and rank the funds accordingly. i.e. Consistency refers
to the managers ability to maintain a level alpha across different CSV regimes.
The manager with the highest consistency measure could be the highest skilled
manager, however it is also possible that he is the luckiest manager. It is neces-
sary to construct this consistency measure so that it removes the possibility of
luck. Using the perfect fund as an example, we would expect to see no change
in alpha adjusted for every CSV regime.
• Remuneration: How should one go about adjusting fund managers remunera-
tion when comparing alpha to adjusted alpha?
• Scale: Increase the size of the study, include more funds while keeping it within
the South African market.
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Fig. A.2: Price paths for Case 2
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Fig. A.3: Price paths for Case 3
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Appendix B
Indices
Tab. B.1: Table of market sector indices
Index Code Full Name Explanation
TOP40 JSE Top 40 JSE Equally Weighted Top 40 Index is a mar-
ket capitalisation weighted index consisting
of stocks in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index
weighted equally at each quarterly review.
RESI20 JSE Resource 20
Index
The FTSE/JSE Resources 20 Index consists of
the 20 largest companies ranked by full mar-
ket value, i.e. before the application of any
investability weightings, as at the date of the
review in the Resources, defined as the com-
bination of Mining and Oil & Gas Sectors.
INDI25 JSE Industrial 25
Index
Industrial 25 Index is a market capitalisation
weighted index consisting of Industrial stocks
in the FTSE/JSE All share Index weighted
equally at each quarterly review.
FINI15 JSE Financial 15
Index
Financial 15 Index is a market capitalisation
weighted index consisting of Financial stocks
in the FTSE/JSE All share Index weighted
equally at each quarterly review.
STeFI Short Term Fixed
Interest Index
Designed to approximate the performance of
money market instruments in the market.
STeFI is a cash index.
ALBIP All Bond Price in-
dex
The BEASSA All Bond Price index comprises
of bonds from across the full range of matur-
ities in the bond market and is a useful sum-
mary measure of the movement in the bond
market. This index does not consider the re-
investment of coupons and therefore only con-
siders the price or capital gain.
Appendix C
Alpha tables
C.1 Raw alpha
Tab. C.1: Raw alphas from OLS regression (Retail)
Alpha Unadjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
ALEQTYF 0.05815 0.08482
CORTP20 -0.02777 0.06721
INVINDX 0.03633 0.08055
CORALSI -0.02659 -0.00820
RMBEQTY 0.01251 -0.05350
PRUOPTM 0.11792 0.04855
Tab. C.2: Raw alphas from OLS regression (Institutional)
Alpha Unadjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Fund 1 -0.04708 -0.04831
Fund 2 -0.00643 -0.00708
Fund 3 0.00433 0.00615
Fund 4 -0.00299 -0.01502
Fund 5 -0.00129 -0.00329
Fund 6 0.00019 0.00200
Fund 7 0.02740 0.02809
Fund 8 -0.00494 0.01607
Fund 9 0.00038 0.01542
Fund 10 0.04783 0.02293
Fund 11 -0.01044 -0.01059
Fund 12 -0.00446 -0.00424
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C.2 CSV adjusted alpha
Tab. C.3: Alphas from WOLS regression (Retail)
Alpha Adjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
ALEQTYF 0.03925 0.09133
CORTP20 -0.03074 0.07708
INVINDX 0.03026 0.08953
CORALSI -0.03499 0.00192
RMBEQTY 0.00606 -0.04303
PRUOPTM 0.11690 0.05806
Tab. C.4: Alphas from WOLS regression (Institutional)
Alpha Adjusted
Jan06-Jan08 Jan11-Jan13
Fund 1 -0.10239 -0.09987
Fund 2 -0.01756 -0.01983
Fund 3 0.01149 -0.00460
Fund 4 -0.00730 -0.03835
Fund 5 -0.01219 -0.02834
Fund 6 -0.00570 -0.00322
Fund 7 0.04739 0.08697
Fund 8 -0.00144 0.02097
Fund 9 -0.00013 0.01293
Fund 10 0.10631 0.02577
Fund 11 -0.03000 -0.00635
Fund 12 -0.00877 -0.01260
Appendix D
Alpha Rankings
D.1 Retail Rankings
Tab. D.1: Table of retail alpha rankings for Time Window 1
Retail W1 Rankings
Fund Name Alpha
CSV Alpha CSV adjusted
adjusted proxy alpha proxy
alpha benchmark benchmark
ALEQTYF 2 2 4 4
CORTP20 6 5 5 5
INVINDX 3 3 2 2
CORALSI 5 6 6 6
RMBEQTY 4 4 3 3
PRUOPTM 1 1 1 1
Tab. D.2: Table of retail alpha rankings for Time Window 2
Retail W2 Rankings
Fund Name Alpha
CSV Alpha CSV adjusted
adjusted proxy alpha proxy
alpha benchmark benchmark
ALEQTYF 1 1 1 1
CORTP20 3 3 4 4
INVINDX 2 2 5 5
CORALSI 5 5 3 3
RMBEQTY 6 6 6 6
PRUOPTM 4 4 2 2
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D.2 Institutional Rankings
Tab. D.3: Table of institutional alpha rankings for Time Window 2
Institutional W1 Rankings
Fund Number
zero-sum CSV Alpha CSV adjusted
alpha adjusted proxy alpha proxy
alpha benchmark benchmark
1 12 12 12 10
2 10 10 7 7
3 3 3 2 2
4 7 7 8 9
5 6 9 5 6
6 5 6 4 4
7 2 2 1 1
8 9 5 9 8
9 4 4 10 11
10 1 1 3 3
11 11 11 6 5
12 8 8 11 12
Tab. D.4: Table of institutional alpha rankings for Time Window 1
Institutional W2 Rankings
Fund Number
zero-sum CSV Alpha CSV adjusted
alpha adjusted proxy alpha proxy
alpha benchmark benchmark
1 12 12 12 12
2 9 9 7 7
3 5 6 8 8
4 11 11 9 9
5 7 10 2 2
6 6 5 6 6
7 1 1 5 4
8 3 3 3 3
9 4 4 4 5
10 2 2 1 1
11 10 7 11 11
12 8 8 10 10
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